effort. If the principal writes a contract with a reward that is monotone increasing in production, then the agent is likely to respond with more effort, and both parties are better off.
Given that the MLR assumption is often required in contexts where a relevant variable can only be observed after incurring monitoring costs, it is not at all surprising that the assumption has not been subjected to empirical scrutiny. If, however, the remunerated party in a principal-agent relation had no private motive for misrepresenting the relevant variable, then data would be available for study. So, it is typically in economic environments where the MLR assumption is not necessary that the data are available.
There remains, however, the opportunity to test for conjectures on the stochastic relationships underlying data in situations where the private incentive to misrepresent is absent. If we had such data, then a direct test for the validity of the MLR assumption would be possible. In this paper, we develop a direct test of the MLR property and apply it to data from two very different contexts: one from agronomy trials and the other from experimental auctions.
In agronomy trials by academic researchers, the private incentive to misrepresent the level of inputs used is typically absent. Agronomic inputs such as water, fertilizers, and chemical pesticides are tangible, while management time, care in planting, and crop scouting activities are less readily measured. The more measurable among these inputs may be reliably observed by a party with no pecuniary interest in the recorded value who is willing to incur the monitoring costs. In this paper, we use data from carefully controlled agronomy trials at a U.S. land grant university to study the relationship between the nitrogen input and corn (Zea mays) output. Milgrom and Weber (1982) extended work by Milgrom (1981b) on the structural role of the MLR order in auctions. They characterized equilibrium properties in common and private value auctions when values co-vary across bidders according to the affiliation property. Under this property, which is also known as multivariate totally positive order 2 (MTP 2 ), large values for some of the variables make the other variables more likely (in the likelihood ratio sense) to be large rather than small. In the context of common value auctions and under the assumption of symmetry among bidders, a test for the affiliation property coincides with a test for the multivariate extension of the MLR property across conditioned densities. 2 In our second application, we test for evidence of affiliation in a multivariate valuation distribution where the data has been obtained from second-price auctions. Because of the Vickrey revelation principle for second-price auctions, bidders have no private incentive to bid other than their values. This makes auction data ideal for our test.
After reviewing the literature on testing for stochastic order, we develop our test for the MLR property. As we cannot preclude the possibility that external factors generate correlations between distribution evaluations, the test allows for such dependence. The two empirical applications are then presented. We find strong support for the assumption of MLR order on corn yield distributions as nitrogen application changes. When studying auction experiments, we find limited evidence in favor of the joint hypothesis that agents are symmetric and valuations are affiliated.
Literature Review
In recent years, several careful tests on stochastic order have been developed, mostly to compare income distributions. Typically, these tests can be adapted to study a variety of stochastic orders. Beach and Davidson (1983) proposed a test of Lorenz curve dominance that explicitly acknowledges that the distribution quantiles are dependent random estimates of the underlying distribution. 3 However, they treat the compared distributions as independent. Beach and Richmond (1985) applied this method to make Lorenz curve comparisons and to calculate a set of joint confidence intervals about income shares. They adopted a multiple comparison framework in which the distributional properties follow the studentized maximum modulus distribution. Relying on Pearson goodness-of-fit tests, Anderson (1996) used a different approach to infer stochastic dominance. Assuming independence, he derived the asymptotic covariance matrix of the frequency vector for the distributions being compared.
Most of the earlier tests (Beach and Davidson 1983; Anderson 1996) are based on a multiple comparison approach. Partitioning the range of the random variables into a finite set of k exhaustive intervals, the multiple comparison approach assesses the order of the distributions on each of the intervals. These multiple hypotheses tests lead to a statistical size bounded by Sidák's inequality, a refinement of Bonferroni's inequality (Savin 1984, pp. 834-35) . This inequality states that a multivariate normal vector with mean zero and arbitrary correlations falls inside a k-dimensional cube centered at the origin. In the special case where the correlations are zero, the test statistic has the studentized maximum modulus distribution, a result that Richmond (1982) Davidson and Duclos extend to the dependent samples context the application by Chow (1989) of the central limit theorem to stochastic inference on dominance orderings with independent samples. Their extension is more general than the result applied by Anderson (1996) , who uses the asymptotic normality of cell frequency counts associated with two independent samples. Davidson and Duclos confine their attention to the class of stochastic orderings that are generated by comparing successive integrations of cdf's.
While the MLR property cannot be presented as such, one of the main theorems in
Davidson and Duclos (Theorem 1) can be readily modified through a transformation to apply to the MLR ordering. Our approach is to make this transformation. The asymptotic distribution of our test statistic therefore does not require the assumption of independence among distributions. Dependence is likely the case for economic applications to contract and auction analysis because the distributions to be studied will be conditioned on common environments or common information sets. The derived test statistic, together with the covariance structure, allows us to apply directly the theory of order-restricted regressions to test for the MLR order.
A Nonparametric Test for Stochastic Order
Let y ~ F be a random variable whose distribution function y ~ F(y | x) is conditioned by the decision variable x, and whose range is limited to the arbitrarily large closed interval A ⊂ » . To set up notation for the statistical test, we divide the range into a partition characterized by the completely ordered vector 1 2 ( ) k , , . . . , a a a and we let a 0 = inf(A). The probability vector i, j = p
denotes the conditional probability that y falls into the jth interval given that the decision variable takes the value
so that p i fully describes the discrete approximation of the conditional distribution. This notation allows us to describe the MLR order in the following manner. 
In this case, we write inference (see Robertson, Wright, and Dykstra 1988) to test for the MLR order.
This section is structured as follows. After preparing the test statistic, we derive its asymptotic distribution. Then we introduce the concepts of order-restricted inference that allow us to proceed with a one-sided test for the MLR order.
A Presentation of Data for Hypothesis Testing
The hypothesis to be tested involves a comparison of m + 1 conditional empirical distribution functions, and the data processing algorithm to be used treats the data as a 
where premultiplication by matrix 1 -k T replaces the numéraire residual probability with an adjacent probability in the ratios given by i, j , and where D m generates comparisons across the distributions under consideration.
Asymptotic Properties of the Test Statistic
Davidson and Duclos (2000) 
and define the mk ×(m + 1)k matrix The proof is provided in Appendix B. Next, we pose the hypothesis that we seek to test.
Hypothesis Testing
We wish to test for H 0 over H 1 where
H 1 : (the distributions are not ordered in the sense of H 0 ).
The test is based on a distance statistic and has been developed in the context of order-restricted inference by Robertson, Wright, and Dykstra (1988) , among others. Let 
The distance statistic equals zero whenever the sample value of ˆr b is consistent with the null hypothesis. 
Problem (6) 
Application to Production Technology
Site-level information on the use of nitrogen and other inputs is not available to crop insurance companies. While these inputs are tangible and purchases of artificial sources of nitrogen can be documented, the inputs can be stored for future use, sold or bartered on secondary markets, or applied on land other than that planted under the insured crop.
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Thus, crop insurers are posed with a moral hazard problem that can be avoided only by incurring prohibitively large monitoring costs. Chambers (1989) has shown that the MLR order plays an important role in understanding the moral hazard constraints that a crop insurer faces when designing a contract. Specifically, with an action-induced MLR dominance order and constant absolute risk aversion, the risk-neutral insurer will leave the grower with a positive fraction of incremental crop revenue. In this way, incomplete risk shifting is used to encourage input use by the grower. 6 The moral hazard problem would appear to be particularly severe in crop agriculture. Babcock and Hennessy (1996) , among others, have identified moral hazard as one of the main reasons for failure of commercial crop insurance markets in the United States and elsewhere. The data previously has been described in Babcock and Hennessy (1996) . Four geographically dispersed farms sites were involved, and ten different nitrogen application levels, ranging from 0 to 300 lb/acre, were applied. The rates were given in 25 lb/acre increments at low application rates and in 50 lb/acre increments at higher application rates. The data set consists of 600 observations where there are 60 observations per nitrogen application rate. In order to aggregate across years and sites, we correct the distributions by year and site factors. The details are provided in Appendix C.
The input-conditioned empirical distributions of corn yields that we compare are the nine pairs of adjacent nitrogen applications rates: 0 lb/acre versus 25 lb/acre through to 250 lb/acre versus 300 lb/acre. To form the partition of the yield range, the vectors of the distributions (two or more) to be compared are stacked and then divided into k + 1 = 5 equiprobable intervals. Then, using these intervals, the empirical cdf is calculated at each nitrogen application rate. The number of intervals was chosen in order to ensure that each cell receives a strictly positive probability weight for each of the distributions being compared.
Results
Note that a rejection of H 0 , implying that y i+1 does not MLR dominate y i , does not imply that y i MLR dominates y i +1. But the comparison of distributions certainly can be turned around to test for the latter relationship. We do so, and consequently we report two sets of results. Because the random variables can be exchanged in this manner, the r b vector for the test in one direction is the additive inverse of the test in the reverse direction. Table 1 In microeconomic analysis, it is common to assume that the MLR order holds globally. Possible value affiliation has been subject to a critical assessment in private-value, multiple-round Vickrey auctions with price posting after every round. As agents extract information on value perceptions from price formation in the market, price posting will allow buyers with affiliated values to update their values iteratively as evidence mounts to allay fears of overbidding. List and Shogren (1999) employed least-squares methods to ascertain how intermediate-round price information affects bidding behavior in multiple-round auctions. Data were drawn from auction experiments evaluating willingness to pay for pathogen-screened meat sandwiches. They found that posted prices (1) do not affect behavior of the median experience bidder, but (2) do influence the behavior of the median bidder among bidders unfamiliar with a product. In contrast to List and Shogren (1999) , who tested for linear correlation between posted price and the median bid in the subsequent round, we apply our methods to test for the MLR order on distributions of bids cast in consecutive rounds.
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Data
We use data from a laboratory auction in which participants were asked for their willingness to pay to exchange a typical meat sandwich with a sandwich that has been carefully screened for either Campylobacter or Salmonella contamination (Shogren et al. 1994 ). The solicitation mechanism was a second-price, multiple-round auction where each group consisted of 15 bidders. The prevailing market price was posted after each round. The auction consisted of 10 rounds of naive bids, where subjects did not receive any information on the risk involved in Campylobacter/Salmonella infection. However, subjects were informed that the stringently screened sandwich posed a probability of illness that amounts to 1 in 100 million. Some summary statistics are provided in Table 2, where we show the median bid alongside the posted price (the second-highest bid) in each round. The prevailing market price varies between $1.00 and $1.38 for the sandwich screened for Campylobacter and between $0.63 and $1.50 for the sandwich screened for
Salmonella.
Results
In our data analysis we chose k = 4. Because the conditioning variables-the posted prices-do not necessarily change monotonically along the sequence of trials, we compare only pairs of distributions (m = 1). Table 2 shows the results in the fourth and fifth columns. Of the 36 comparisons, we find only two rejections, one in the case of Campylobacter and one in the case of Salmonella. This means that a statistically significant MLR ordering on the distribution shift cannot be discerned for most comparisons. The two instances where we identify the MLR order are the comparison of trials 2 and 3 in the instance of Campylobacter and in the case of trials 1 and 2 in the instance of Salmonella. For both pathogens, the price signal has shifted the distribution upwards in the MLR sense. That is, the price information was taken by the subjects to be a positive signal, "good news" in the words of Milgrom (1981a) .
Our results confirm those of List and Shogren (1999) . For newcomers evaluating unfamiliar goods, price posting might lead to weak affiliation of the bid distribution. If posted prices were interpreted as informative signals on value, we would expect this to be the case early in the auction. However, the affiliation effect disappears after trial 3 when the information-adjusted values settle to a new equilibrium.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a robust procedure for testing for stochastic order among distributions that takes explicit account of the correlation structure of the distributions being compared. Using agricultural crop trials data, we applied the test to identify stochastic order in the likelihood ratio sense. Our results support the hypothesis of MLR order over a large range of input levels. We conclude that the MLR assumption commonly made in theoretical work is confirmed for our data set. In a second application, we studied private evaluations of a new good in a multiple-round Vickrey auction to identify some evidence in favor of the affiliated values assumption commonly employed in the economics of imperfect information.
Other stochastic orders also arise in economic models. The test can be extended to accommodate alternative univariate stochastic orders such as the reverse hazard (monotone probability ratio) order, which has arisen in portfolio theory (Athey 2002 ) and elsewhere.
Endnotes
1. Under the simple stochastic order, the compared distributions cannot intersect and the dominating distribution lies underneath the dominated distribution. Under the MLR order, the ratio of the densities, say f 2 (x)/f 1 (x) where f 2 (x) dominates, is monotone increasing where defined. Graphically, one implication of the MLR ordering is that the ordered densities can cross no more than once.
2. The affiliation property is defined on lattice-structured sets. We direct the interested reader to Athey 2002. See Shaked and Shanthikumar 1994 (p. 132 and p. 253) on the relation between the multivariate MLR order and the affiliation property. It suffices to test for the MLR property instead of for affiliation because the standard model in auction theory assumes symmetry across agent strategies and beliefs so that all agents have the same probability function on valuations. Bartolucci and Forcina (2000) , in contrast, have developed a likelihood ratio test for the MTP 2 property on a distribution of binary variables. Such a test, were it extended to continuous variables, would make it possible to dispense with the symmetry condition in deriving the test hypothesis.
3. As Lorenz curves are constructed with share data, Lorenz-curve dominance may be interpreted as a mean-preserving contraction in the variability of income shares.
4. An increase in this order increases the expected value of all increasing and concave functions.
5. Farmers typically rotate land through different crops in order to disrupt the progression of pest infestations, to replenish soil nutrients, and to rest ground from intensive cultivation practices. For corn in the midwestern United States, the most common rotations are corn-soybean and corn-corn-soybean.
6. Were risk-neutral insurers perfectly informed, then they would have assumed all the risk. Thus, the equilibrium contract is not optimal but it is an informationconstrained optimum.
7. Commercial crop insurance markets do exist in the United States, but their viability is underpinned by government subsidies. Also, the U.S. federal government has at times made crop insurance coverage a pre-requisite in determining eligibility for agricultural income support. 
